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COPYRIGHT, BORROWED IMAGES, AND APPROPRIATION
ART: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
William M Landes*
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I examine from the standpoint of economics the rela-
tionship between copyright law, borrowed images, and the post-modem art
form known as appropriation art.
Appropriation art borrows images from popular culture, advertising,
the mass media, other artists and elsewhere, and incorporates them into
new works of art.' Often, the artist's technical skills are less important than
his conceptual ability to place images in different settings and, thereby,
change their meaning. Appropriation art has been commonly described "as
getting the hand out of art and putting the brain in." Some appropriation art
does not implicate copyright law at all. For example, Marcel Duchamp
exhibited ready-made objects such as a urinal, bicycle wheel, and snow
shovel as works of art. But when the borrowed image is copyrighted, ap-
propriation art risks infringing the rights of the copyright owner.
Artists and judges have very different views regarding how the law
should treat appropriation art. The artist perceives legal restraints on bor-
rowing as a threat to artistic freedom. The following quote is typical.
Whenever people's response is 'how dare you!' I consider that a high compli-
ment. First of all, taking from other artists is not illegal in the art world, as it is
in the music industry, and second, it is a direct acknowledgment of how we
work in painting. Everything you do is based on what came before and what is
happening concurrently. I don't see history as monolithic. I feel very free to
take and change whatever I want, and that includes borrowing from my con-
temporaries. If some people are upset because my work has similarities to
what they're doing, that's their problem. And if they take from me, that's
great! I don't respect these artificial boundaries that artists and people around
artists erect to keep you in a certain category.2
The law takes a more traditional view of appropriation art. Artists re-
* Clifton R. Musser Professor of Law & Economics at the University of Chicago Law School.
This article is based on a lecture I presented on April 16, 2000, in the series "The Founding Fathers of
Law and Economics" at George Mason University's James M. Buchanan Center for Political Econ-
omy. I would like to thank Elisabeth M. Landes, Richard A. Posner, and Charles Rowley for many
helpful comments.
I For very helpful discussions of appropriation art and copyright, see E. Kenly Ames, Note,
Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard for Appropriation, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473 (1993)
and Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and Post-Modernism, I I
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1992).
2 Richard Rubenstein, Abstraction in a Changing Environment, 82 ART IN AM. 102, 103 (Oct.
1994) (quoting the artist Richmond Burton).
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ceive no special privileges to borrow copyrighted material. For example, in
Rogers v. Koons,3 the court held that Jeff Koons' sculpture of puppies had
infringed the plaintiff's copyrighted photograph. In rejecting Koons' fair
use defense, the court stated:
Here, the essence of Rogers' photograph was copied nearly in toto, much more
than would have been necessary even if the sculpture had been a parody of
plaintiff's work. In short, it is not really the parody flag that appellants are
sailing under, but rather the flag of piracy.4
I approach the law's treatment of appropriation art and the general
question of borrowing pre-existing images from an economic perspective.
Richard A. Posner and I have shown elsewhere that copyright law has an
implicit economic logic.5 Its doctrines are best explained as efforts to cre-
ate rights in intangible property in order to promote economic efficiency.
To some, it may appear especially odd to look at both copyright and art in
terms of economics. I hope to convince you otherwise by showing that
economics can illuminate a variety of legal disputes involving borrowed
images and appropriation art.
This paper is organized as follows. Part I sets out a number of exam-
ples based on actual legal disputes that illustrate several important copy-
right problems I want to examine. Some examples directly involve artists,
while others involve institutions that deal in visual images. Part II reviews
the basic law and economics of copyright. Part III applies the economic
model to the cases, and Part IV presents some concluding remarks on how
copyright law can accommodate the sometimes conflicting interests be-
tween appropriation artists and copyright holders.
I. SOME EXAMPLES OF THE PROBLEM
Let me start with four examples outside the area of appropriation art
concerning disputes over reproduction rights to works of art. These exam-
ples have in common with appropriation art the borrowing of pre-existing
images for the creation of a new work. The examples also help illustrate
the main theme of my paper: namely, that appropriation art poses no spe-
3 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
4 Id. at 310. Koons' sculpture was prepared for a 1988 exhibition entitled "The Banality Show."
Id. at 304. Copyright infringement suits were also brought successfully against two other Koons
sculptures from the show. See Campbell v. Koons, No. 91CIV.6055, 1993 WL 97381, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 1, 1993) (involving Campbell's copyrighted photograph of two boys and a pig); United Feature
Syndicate v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (involving the character "Odie" from the
"Garfield the Cat" comic strip).
5 See generally William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries, and other Un-
published Works: An Economic Approach, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 79 (1992); Richard A. Posner, When Is
Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1992); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Copyright Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
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cial problems for copyright law. The current federal statute allows one to
resolve conflicts over borrowed images in an economically efficient way
and requires no special consideration for artists.
1 A copies B's copy of a painting in the public domain.
2. A makes and sells a CD-ROM containing copies of B's digital
reproductions of old master paintings in the public domain.
3. A museum reproduces its collection of copyrighted and public
domain works in digital format. It places the reproductions on its
Website. Other individuals download these images and distribute
them over the Internet.
4. A purchases B's copyrighted note cards, affixes them to tiles,
and sells them as decorative objects.
Example "1" comes from a lawsuit against a firm for making unau-
thorized copies of an engraver's reproductions of old master paintings.6
Example "2" describes a case rejecting copyright for digital images of
works in museum collections.7 Example "3" comes from recent proposals
involving educational fair use guidelines for digital images.8 The final
example relates to a copyright claim against a firm for affixing tiles to
lawfully acquired copyrighted images and reselling them.9
Next, I turn to a number of examples involving artist defendants who
have borrowed images from preexisting works. These examples cover the
range of copyright problems that appropriation artists are likely to face.
1. A creates a unique collage that includes a copyrighted photo-
graph taken by B.
2. A creates a limited edition series of prints that incorporates B's
copyrighted photograph.
3. The same facts as in the above example, plus reproductions of
A's prints appear on posters, calendars, and other mass produced
merchandise.
6 See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
7 See Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) amended 36
F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
8 See The Conference on Fair Use: Final Report to the Commissioner on the Conclusion of the
Conference of Fair Use, at 33-40 (Sept. 1998).
9 See Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997); Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque
A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).
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4. A creates a work that appropriates the outline of a nude from B's
photograph, the distinctive color from C's monochromatic
painting, and a miniature yellow square from D's painting.
5. A constructs several identical sculptural works based on B's
copyrighted photograph or comic book character.
6. A creates a work that contains elements substantially similar to
one of his earlier works owned by B who also happens to own
the copyright in that work.
The first three examples are based upon lawsuits brought by photog-
raphers against, among others, Robert Rauschenberg and Andy Warhol for
using copyrighted photographs in their works." Example "4" describes a
lawsuit in Germany brought by the well-known photographer Helmut
Newton against the artist George Pusenkoff who claimed that his paintings
"quote" rather than borrow from other artists." Example "5" comes from
several lawsuits brought against the artist Jeff Koons. 2 Example "6" is a
special case of an artist appropriating images from his prior works. 3 Here,
the question of copyright infringement arises because another party holds
the copyright in the earlier work.
II. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT
A. The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection
To begin, let me briefly set out the economic rationale for copyright
protection and the basic structure of the law. 4 Copyright protects original
works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible form. "Original" does not
mean novel or creative, but simply that the work originates with the
author. Originality is a threshold question. Its purpose is to save adminis-
10 Both Warhol and Rauschenberg settled out of court. Warhol paid $6,000 cash and royalties on
the print edition of Flowers to the photographer Patricia Caulfield who had threatened to sue Warhol
over his flower paintings. Rauschenberg gave the photographer Richard Beebe $3,000 and a copy of
the allegedly infringing work worth about $10,000. These cases and others involving the artists Sherri
Levine, David Salle, and Susan Pitt are discussed in Ames, supra note 1, at 1484-85.
1 See Geraldine Norman, The Power of Borrowed Images, ART & ANTIQUES, Mar. 1996, at 123
(discussing the Pusenkoff case).
12 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); Campbell v. Koons, No. 91CIV.6055,
1993 WL 97381, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. I, 1993); United Feature Syndicate v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also supra, notes 3-4, and accompanying text.
13 See Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat'l Wildlife Art Exchange, Inc., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978).
14 For a more complete analysis, see Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
supra note 5.
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trative and enforcement costs by screening out works that would be cre-
ated even without copyright protection.
Original works include, among others, books, photographs, paintings,
sculpture, musical compositions, technical drawings, computer software,
sitcoms, movies, maps, and business directories. These works all have in
common what economists call a "public goods aspect" to them. Creating
these works involve a good deal of time, money, and effort (sometimes
called the "cost of expression"). Once created, however, the cost of repro-
ducing the work is so low that additional users can be added at a negligible
or even zero cost. Thus, the cost of making ten or 250 copies of a print are
roughly the same once the plate has been created. 5 It follows that in the
absence of copyright protection, unauthorized copying or free riding on the
creator's expression would tend to drive the price of copies down to the
cost of making them. But then the party who expended the resources to
create the work in the first place will be unable to recover his costs. Hence,
the incentive to create new works will be significantly undermined without
protection against unauthorized copying.
In the case of unique works, such as a painting, the case for copyright
protection is weaker because the main source of income typically comes
from the sale of the work itself and not from the sale of copies. Still, un-
authorized copying or free riding on unique art works will reduce the in-
come an artist receives from posters, note cards, puzzles, coffee mugs,
mouse pads, t-shirts, and other derivative works that incorporate images
from the original work. And without this source of the income there will
be less incentive ex ante to create unique works. As these examples sug-
gest, copyright covers more than just a right to prevent unauthorized
copying. It also includes rights over the distribution of copies, derivative
works, public performances, and displays.
To be sure, some original works will still be created even in the ab-
sence of copyright protection. There may be substantial benefits from be-
ing recognized as the creator or from being first in the market, or the cop-
ies may be of "inferior" quality. In the art market, even perfect or unsigned
copies are often deemed inferior and sell for much less than original
works.16 A striking example of this phenomenon is the much higher price
paid for vintage photographs (prints made at the time the photograph was
taken) than the identical photograph printed later from the same nega-
tive.17 Creators may also use contract law or other private enforcement
15 For prints, as opposed to photographs, there will be some deterioration in quality as the num-
ber of prints increases.
16 And, if copies are good substitutes for an original work, the creator may be able to charge a
higher price for his work to reflect the benefits from subsequent uses that are not protected by copy-
right.
17 Consider the following two examples. Dorothea Lange's widely reproduced 1930s vintage
photograph known as "Migrant Mother" recently sold at a Sotheby's photography auction October 7,
2000]
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means to discourage unauthorized copying. For example, an artist could
sell his work subject to a contract term that prohibits the buyer from mak-
ing unauthorized copies or derivative works. But a contract, unlike a copy-
right, would be difficult to enforce against third parties or subsequent pur-
chasers of the original work.
A related point should be noted. Unauthorized reproductions of a
painting or sculpture that appear on all sorts of merchandise will call
greater attention to the original work. Such free "advertising" or publicity
may enhance the artist's reputation and increase the value of his works.
But the reverse may also happen. Sophisticated collectors may turn away
from artists whose images have become too commercial and common-
place. Because one cannot say a priori which effect will dominate, vesting
adaptation or derivative work rights in the artist will create an incentive for
him to license his work only in those instances where he expects the over-
all effect to be positive.
In short, given the speed and low cost of copying as well as the diffi-
culty of employing private measures to prevent copying, we would expect
a decrease in the number of new works created in the absence of copyright
protection. This leaves open the question of how extensive copyright pro-
tection should be. The answer depends on the costs as well as the benefits
of protection. Two costs, in particular, should be noted.
B. The Costs of Copyright Protection
First, copyright protection generates access costs related to the public
goods aspect of copyrighted works. Access costs fall on consumers who
value the work by more than the cost of making additional copies, but less
than the price being charged. Access costs also fall on creators who are
deterred from building upon prior works because they are unwilling to pay
the price the copyright holder demands. Copyright protection, therefore,
raises the cost of creating new works. Paradoxically, too much copyright
protection can reduce the number of new works created. To be sure, the
copyright owner has an incentive to reduce prices for potential customers
initially denied access. But information costs and arbitrage may make
price discrimination infeasible.'8 In contrast, access costs are not a signifi-
1998, for $244,500. See Peter Lennon, Whatever Happened to All These Heroes?, THE GUARDIAN,
Dec. 30, 1998. An exhibition quality print of "Migrant Mother" from the original or a copy negative
can be obtained for less than $50 from the Library of Congress Photoduplication Service at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/print/guide/price.html. An Edward Weston's vintage photograph from 1929
entitled "Pepper" sold at a Christie's photography auction on October 6, 1997, for $74,000. A print
from the same negative printed later by the photographer's son, Cole Weston, sold at an auction at
Swann Galleries (Apr. 24, 1996) for $1,840, see http://artprice.com.searchartprice.com.
18 One possibility is a two-part pricing scheme where users pay entry fees that cover the costs of
expression and a separate "small" charge that covers the marginal cost of making copies. Note that
two-part pricing can generate access costs as well if some parties are unwilling to pay the initial fee,
[VOL. 9:1
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cant problem for most tangible goods. 9 In a competitive industry, the price
of a tangible good equals its marginal cost. Only individuals who value the
good at less than its price or, equivalently, its marginal cost, are denied
access.
The second major cost of a copyright system are administrative and
enforcement costs. These include the costs of setting up boundaries or
erecting imaginary fences that separate protected and unprotected elements
of a work. They also include the costs of excluding trespassers, and appre-
hending and sanctioning violators. These costs tend to be greater for intan-
gible than tangible property.2°
C. Doctrines that Limit Copyright Protection
Because copyright tends to be a costly system of property, economics
predicts more limited rights for copyrighted works than for tangible or
physical property. Positive economic analysis of copyright law aims to
show that various copyright doctrines that limit protection can be best ex-
but more than willing to pay the marginal cost of copying. In theory, these access costs can be elimi-
nated by lowering the up-front charge to those parties though information costs may make this infeasi-
ble. A particular ingenious example of two-part pricing is the blanket license that users pay for public
performance rights to copyrighted music. Since the marginal cost of performing already created music
is zero, access costs would be minimized by charging a zero price for additional performances. Under
the terms of the blanket license a user pays a fixed fee for the right to perform any of the millions of
songs in the repertory of the performing rights society as many times as he wants during the term of
the license. In effect, this is a two-part price: an initial fee plus a zero price for additional uses corre-
sponding to the zero marginal cost of additional performances. The two major performing rights socie-
ties in the United States are the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI). For additional information on the performing rights societies, see
ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 575-83 (5th ed.
1999).
19 Two exceptions are monopolies and "public goods" where prices or other means of rationing
may exclude some individuals who value the good by more than the cost of their use.
20 To see why these costs tend to be greater, consider the kinds of questions that must be an-
swered in deciding the scope of, say, a photographer's copyright. Suppose A first creates a photograph
and B later creates a similar photograph after having studied A's photograph. Does B's photograph of
the same subject matter, say a portrait of Tiger Woods, infringe A's photograph? If not, imagine that
B's photograph also employs the same background, angles, lighting, colors, and so on. Does B's pho-
tograph now infringe A's work? Or suppose C creates a collage that combines parts of A's photograph
with other materials. Does the collage infringe A's copyright? Would it make a difference if the col-
lage involves painting over A's photograph so only Tiger Woods' eyes are recognizable? Would a
commercial or television program that reproduces A's copyrighted photograph even for a few seconds
infringe A's copyright? What about a critical review of A's work that reproduces one of A's copy-
righted photographs? Suppose A's photograph is based on an earlier photograph of Tiger Woods in the
public domain. Is A's photograph still copyrightable, and if so, how much is protected? This also raises
difficult evidentiary questions. For example, suppose B had access to both A's photograph and the
public domain photograph. How does one decide whether B copied from the public domain or from
A's photograph or from both? And even if B copied from A, has B infringed A's copyright? Maybe B
just copied unprotected elements of A's work including what A had copied from the public domain.
Answering these questions requires fixing abstract boundary lines that separate protected from unpro-
tected elements of a work and then determining if the alleged infringer has violated these boundaries.
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plained as efforts to achieve the optimal balance between incentive bene-
fits and access and other costs in order to promote economic efficiency.2
Consider the following copyright doctrines.
1. Protection of Expression
Copyright protects expression, but not ideas.22 Protecting original
ideas would involve substantial administrative and enforcement costs. It is
far simpler to determine if B has copied A's original expression than A's
original idea. In addition, most original ideas in copyrighted works are
trivial and involve small expenditures of time and effort relative to the cost
of expressing them. Hence, the added incentive benefits from protecting
ideas would likely be swamped by the resulting access and administrative
costs.
2. Protection Against Copying
Copyright protects against copying, but not independent duplication.23
Here the element of free riding is missing, so independent duplication will
not significantly undermine the incentives to create new works. Two other
points reinforce this result. First, independent duplication should be rare
for most works. Second, if independent duplication were actionable,
authors would spend less time creating new works and more time checking
earlier works to avoid copyright liability. This would lead society to ex-
pend greater resources on administering the copyright system in order to
enable authors to search records, compare their work to prior works, and
determine how likely an infringement would be found.2 4 In short, since
independent duplication is probably rare, it is unlikely that the added in-
centive benefits from making independent duplication actionable would be
21 See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 5.
22 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (2000).
23 See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936). Judge Learned Hand
stated that "if by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keat's Ode on a
Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem,
though they might of course copy Keats's. But though a copyright is, for this reason less vulnerable
than a patent, the owner's protection is more limited, for just as he is no less an 'author' because others
have preceded him, so another who follows him, is not a tort-feasor unless he pirates his work." Id. at
54 (citations omitted).
24 It is worth observing that the present copyright registration system involves minimal time and
cost. Registration creates a public record of the basic facts of the copyright. An applicant seeking to
register his work submits a $30 filing fee and fills out a short form listing the work's title, author, year
of creation, and date and place of publication (if published). The applicant must also deposit a copy of
the work (or, in cases where this is not feasible, a photograph of the work). Registration is optional and
is not a condition for copyright protection. The Copyright Office makes no effort to search prior copy-
righted works for similarities with the applicant's work before registering the copyright. Registration
information and forms are available online from the U.S. Copyright Office Website at
http://www.loc.gov/copyright.
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worth the extra costs it would entail.
3. Right of Adaptation
Copyright gives the creator adaptation rights on his work. This right,
called the derivative works right, is broader than the right to prevent un-
authorized copying for it covers "any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed or adapted."25 Painting a mustache on the Mona Lisa or
cutting up an original Picasso painting into a thousand pieces and reselling
each piece as an "original" Picasso are examples of derivative works. But
destroying a painting, say by torching it, is not.26
The economic rationale for giving the original copyright holder rights
over derivative works depends both on the added incentives to create
original works and on the savings in transaction and enforcement costs that
result from concentrating property rights in a single party. Consider first
the incentive argument. One might reason that any added incentive benefit
would be negligible, since only a few successful copyrighted works will
generate income from derivative works. Moreover, there will likely be a
substantial time lag between the date of the original work and the later
derivative works. This, however, confuses ex ante and ex post returns.
Even if the number of artists who receive substantial income from ancil-
lary products is small, the ex ante return, which depends on both the small
probability and the potentially large income from ancillary products, could
be large relative to the artist's other expected earnings.27
Turning to transaction and enforcement costs, consider the late artist
Andy Warhol. Several hundred ancillary products ranging from umbrellas
to condoms incorporate images from Warhol's works. 8 By concentrating
the copyrights in the Warhol Foundation rather than having each creator of
a derivative work hold a separate copyright, the court avoids potentially
25 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(2) (2000) and the definition of a derivative work in 17 U.S.C.A. § 101
(2000).
26 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(3)(B) (2000). Intentionally destroying a work of recognized stature
can violate the moral rights of the creator of a work of visual art under the Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990, which is now part of the Copyright Act. See id.
27 Another incentive consideration is the potential harm that may result from an unauthorized
adaptation that tarnishes the artist's reputation and reduces his future earnings. But so might a critical
review reduce future earnings. Why is the latter allowed, even if it reproduces some of the artist's
work, but not an unauthorized derivative work? On average, artists should benefit from reviews be-
cause they provide information on the underlying works. To be sure, the demand for works that are
trashed by reviewers will decline, but that should be more than offset by the increase in demand for
works that are praised. Moreover, the value of the information provided by reviews is enhanced when
the reviewer does not have to acquire the right from the artist to review his works. Consistent with the
economic approach, reviews that borrow some original expression are a non-infringing or fair use of
the original work.
28 For a sampling of more than 100 Warhol items, see The Warhol Store on the website of The
Andy Warhol Museum at http://www.clpgh.org/warhol.
20001
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burdensome lawsuits involving multiple plaintiffs. For example, how
would a court decide, among many similar and widely accessible works,
which one the defendant copied from? Licensing costs would also rise
because a potential licensee would be well advised to seek licenses from
many parties to avoid the risk of being sued by one of them. Finally, the
copyright on the original Warhol image is sufficient to prevent unauthor-
ized copying of the various derivative works since a party copying from a
derivative work will still infringe the copyright on the original work.
4. Doctrine of Fair Use
My final example is the fair use doctrine.29 Fair use limits the rights
of the copyright holder by allowing unauthorized copying in circumstances
that are roughly consistent with promoting economic efficiency. One such
circumstance involves high transaction costs. For example, copying a few
pages from a book probably does not harm the copyright holder because
the copier would not have bought the book. But if copying were prohib-
ited, transactions costs would prevent an otherwise beneficial exchange
from taking place. Here, fair use creates a net social gain. The copier bene-
fits, and the copyright holder is not harmed.3"
Another circumstance that justifies fair use may be termed implied
consent. Consider a newspaper or television review of art exhibition that
reproduces a few copyrighted images from the show. This will provide
useful information to consumers that, on average, will tend to expand the
demand for the underlying works. Moreover, if the law required the re-
viewer to obtain the artist's consent to reproduce these images, readers
would have less confidence in the objectivity of the review. In these cir-
cumstances, fair use can produce beneficial incentive effects and reduce
access cost as well.
The final category of fair use involves some harm to the copyright
holder that is more than offset by lower access costs and possible benefits
to third parties. Here, courts treat productive uses more favorably than
reproductive uses of a borrowed work.31 The former, such as a parody,
transforms the original work into a new work and is unlikely to substitute
for the original work or reduce anticipated licensing revenues in any sub-
stantial way. Moreover, the cost of creating the transformative work falls
because transaction and licensing costs are avoided. A reproductive use, on
29 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (2000).
30 The high transaction cost rationale should be narrowly construed. Otherwise, it would reduce
the incentive to develop innovative market mechanisms that reduce transaction costs. These include
performing rights societies like ASCAP and BMI, the Copyright Clearance Center for journals, and
two arts organizations (Visual Artists and Galleries Association and The Artists Rights Society) that
license reproduction rights to the works of many artists.
31 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
[VOL. 9:1
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the other hand, is more likely to substitute for the original work and, there-
fore, has significant negative effects on the incentives to create that work
in the first place.
Parody may also be protected as a fair use. Parody can involve high
transaction costs due to the difficulty of negotiating with someone at
whom you wish to poke fun. It provides information or critical comment,
like a review. Finally, parody can be a transformative or productive use of
the original work. Still, calling something a parody is not a blanket license
to copy the parodied work. Parody is limited in two ways. One is that the
parody can only take what is necessary to conjure up the original work. It
cannot take so much of the original work that it effectively substitutes for
that work. The other is that the parody must target the work it parodies.32
Here, the economic rationale is that a voluntary transaction is less likely
when the parody attacks a particular work than when it uses the work to
comment on or criticize society at large.
Before I move on to the cases, let me mention a major economic puz-
zle about copyright-its long duration. Today, a copyright lasts for the life
of the author plus seventy years. But from an incentive standpoint, the
present value of $1,000 in say ninety-five years is trivial given any reason-
able discount rate. On the other hand, life plus seventy years can create
substantial access costs (including the cost of tracking down the copyright
owner and licensing the work) because a smaller amount of public domain
material is available at any point in time. Thus, a shorter copyright term
would reduce access costs without significantly reducing the incentives to
create new works. There are several plausible, but not convincing, argu-
ments for a long copyright term. These include the possibility that the re-
turns from copyrighted works occur mainly in the last few years; that a
near perpetual term avoids the tragedy of the commons; and that the value
of an author's earlier works will be enhanced by his later efforts. The first
argument appears factually wrong based on some scattered data showing
that copyrights were rarely renewed when renewal was a condition of ex-
tending protection from twenty-eight to seventy-five years.33 The second
overlooks the fact that copyrighted expression is not exhaustible so the
tragedy of the commons does not apply. Unlike natural resources that can
be used up by over exploitation, previous editions of Shakespeare's works
do not preclude publishers from bringing out new editions. Finally, the
third argument might account for a copyright term that extends twenty or
so years after the author's death, but not the current time of life plus sev-
enty years.34
32 See id.; see also Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, supra note 5.
33 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 133-36 (1976) reprinted in GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note
18, at 343 (noting that about 85 percent of all copyrighted works are not renewed).
34 Consider the following illustration. Imagine that a copyrighted work yields $1 royalties each
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III. APPLYING THE THEORY TO THE CASES
A. Cases Outside Appropriation Art
Consider first the cases outside appropriation art. They have in com-
mon with appropriation art the production of new works based upon im-
ages from prior works.
1. Copying a Copy of a Public Domain Work
In Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts,35 the defendant reproduced
and sold copies of the plaintiffs mezzotint engravings of 18th and 19th
century paintings in the public domain. The plaintiffs engravings were
realistic reproductions requiring great skill and judgment. The defendant
had argued that since the engravings were merely copies of works in the
public domain, they failed the originality requirement. In short, the defen-
dant claimed that he was doing nothing more than he was entitled to do-
copying a public domain image, albeit by copying from a copy. The defen-
dant lost the case, as he should have. Originality lay in the art of copying,
which required significant expenditures of time, effort, and skill. Free rid-
ing by the defendant would undermine the plaintiffs incentives to produce
high-quality copies of public domain works. Moreover, copyright protec-
tion does not prevent the defendant from hiring engravers and making
copies of the same paintings or from licensing the right to make copies
from the plaintiff. Copyright merely protects the plaintiff's investment in
copying from the public domain without cutting off the defendant's access
to the original paintings.
Will the price of copies be higher following the Alfred Bell decision?
One's initial reaction might be "yes." After all, if the defendant had won
the case, this would lower his cost of copying and the added competition
with the plaintiff would translate into lower prices. But this result assumes
that the plaintiff's copies would still exist. In the future, however, the ab-
sence of copyright protection would discourage firms from hiring skilled
craftsmen to copy public domain works. And as the supply of high quality
copies dried up, the price of future copies will tend to increase. 36
year after the author's death and assume a discount rate of 10 percent. The present value of an annual
$1 royalty equals $9.99 under a 70-year term, and $9.31 under a 28-year term. Hence over 93 percent
of the value of the copyright is received in the first twenty-eight years. In this example, therefore, the
added incentive effects of extending copyright beyond 28 years would be minimal.
35 191 F.2d99(2dCir. 1951).
36 An additional point is worth mentioning. Copyright protection in Alfred Bell does not result in
the plaintiff earning monopoly profits. Copyright prevents free riding, but not entry by new firms. To
be sure, the price of a copy will tend to be greater than the cost of making one more copy. But entry
will occur until the marginal firm just covers its full cost of making copies without free riding plus a
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2. Copying a Digital Copy of a Public Domain Work
Now imagine a copyist so skilled that he produces near perfect repro-
ductions of the original work. In Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp. ,37
the plaintiff Bridgeman produced and marketed color transparencies and
digital images of well-known public domain works of art in museum col-
lections. Bridgeman claimed that defendant Corel sold compact disks
containing images that it had copied from Bridgeman's transparencies. The
court likened Bridgeman's transparencies to copies produced by a photo-
copy machine. And since photocopying obviously fails the originality re-
quirement, so would Bridgeman's transparencies. But this misconstrues
the purpose of the originality requirement. Photocopying should fail the
originality requirement because the element of free riding is missing. If
creating high-quality transparencies were as easy as photocopying, copy-
ing from Bridgeman's copies would cost Corel about the same as photo-
graphing the underlying works. Free riding would be minimal. Copyright
protection should be rejected since it would create unnecessary adminis-
trative costs without offsetting incentive benefits. Creating high-quality
transparencies of art works, however, is a time consuming process that
requires considerable skill on the part of the photographer or copyist. Just
as in Alfred Bell, it is significantly cheaper to copy from Bridgeman than
to create the transparencies from the underlying works. Moreover, copy-
right protection will not deny Corel access to these works. Rather, Corel
will have to pay museums to gain access to them or license the reproduc-
tions from Bridgeman. Finally, note that the Bridgeman court's decision
that originality requires a "distinguishable variation" between the original
and copy (that cannot be satisfied by a simple change in medium)38 creates
a perverse incentive to produce second-rate or poor quality copies. Such
copies have less commercial and educational value, but are more likely to
satisfy the originality requirement.
The Bridgeman case brings out another consideration-the costs of
administering a copyright system-that works against copyright protection
for exact reproductions of public domain works. To illustrate, suppose A
and B both make exact reproductions of the same painting in the public
domain. Assume further that B has had access to both the original painting
and A's copy before making his own copy. If A sues B for infringement, a
trier of fact would have difficulty deciding whether B had copied from the
original painting, or from A, or from both. Since A's and B's copies are
nearly identical, the usual legal test for copying-access plus substantial
normal return on its capital.
37 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
38 See id. at 196 (quoting L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (en
bane)).
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similarity-would not help one decide if B had copied from A. Alterna-
tively, direct evidence on copying is usually unobtainable or costly to de-
velop. These sorts of complications would multiply when several other
parties, say C, D, and E, also made copies of the same public domain
painting. Then a slew of overlapping claims could arise that would entan-
gle a court in costly litigation over whether B had copied from A, or the
original painting, or someone else. Additional litigation may also arise
among A, C, D, and E because all have produced copies that are substan-
tially similar to the same public domain work and hence to each other.
Each copyist might claim that the other parties had unlawfully copied from
its copy. To be sure, the parties have an incentive to enter into licensing
arrangements or settle their disputes to avoid expensive litigation. But li-
censing and settling are costly.39 In short, copyright protection would be
economically efficient only if the added incentive benefits to create high-
quality copies of works in the public domain outweighed the extra admin-
istrative and licensing costs. This suggests that the socially efficient result
could well be the current law that conditions copyright on a non-trivial
variation between the copy and the public domain work.
3. Copying Both Public Domain and Copyrighted Works
Now suppose a museum or educational institution wishes to create
and distribute digital images of works in its collection. Clearly, if the
works are in the public domain, it may make and distribute copies. On the
other hand, the museum may not know if a particular work is still under
copyright and, if it is, who owns the copyright. For works created after
January 1, 1978, the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act, the museum
probably has to obtain permission from the copyright holder to reproduce
them unless the artist has transferred the copyright to the museum.
For works created before 1978, there is no easy answer to whether the
museum can make copies. Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act (the "Act"),
common law copyright protected unpublished works in perpetuity.4" The
Act expressly preempted common law copyright and established a single
federal system that protected a work from the moment it is fixed in a tan-
gible form." l For works that were unpublished at the time of the Act, the
earliest the copyright would expire is 2002 or, if the work were later pub-
39 See generally Pickett v. Prince 207 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2000); Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698
F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983). Both Posner opinions discuss the administrative, enforcement, and licensing
costs arising from copyright protection for works that are substantially similar to each other because
they are based on earlier copyrighted or public domain works. See also Durhan Indus., Inc. v. Tomy
Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980); L. Batlin & Son, 536 F.2d 486.
40 See GORMAN & GtNSBURG, supra note 18, at 72.
41 17 U.S.C.A. § 301 (2000).
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lished, 2027.42 In theory, a 19th century painting could be still copyrighted,
if it had never been published. For unique works of art, publication is not a
self-defining term. The Act defines "publication" as the distribution of
copies (including the first copy that embodies the copyright) to the public
for sale or other transfers of ownership.43 However, the law has not treated
the sale of a unique work, as opposed to prints, as a publication.' The
statute specifies that a public display is not a publication. 45 The distribu-
tion of reproductions might be treated as either a publication of copies or a
derivative work. Publication of a derivative work, however, may not con-
stitute publication of the original work.46 To complicate matters, copyright
law also developed the concept of limited publication, which does not con-
stitute publication for the purpose of divesting one's common law copy-
right. Finally, if a pre-1978 work is still copyrighted, the museum may
own the copyright because in some states the so-called "Pushman" pre-
sumption meant that the transfer of a unique work also transferred the
copyright to the new owner.47
What does one make of these complications? At a minimum, one can
say there is great uncertainty over whether licenses must be obtained to
reproduce older works. A fair use claim might work given the high trans-
action costs of determining whether a work is still copyrighted and who
owns the copyright. Still, a prudent museum director might well be reluc-
tant to reproduce many important works in the museum's collections. The
market, however, has responded to this problem. There are now two im-
portant organizations-the Visual Artists and Galleries Association and
the Artists Rights Society-that facilitate licensing between persons de-
siring to reproduce works of art and copyright holders. Each organization
publishes a list of artists they represent, keeps a slide catalogue of works of
its members, and acts as agents in negotiating licenses for reproductions of
art in monographs, greeting cards, postcards, merchandise, advertisement,
films, and on.48 In short, the desirability of requiring museums and educa-
tional institutions to obtain permission to make reproductions depends on
42 Id. See also GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 339-59 (discussing copyright duration
for works created both before and after the 1976 Copyright Act and the transition from the 1909 Copy-
right Act to the 1976 Act).
43 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (2000).
44 See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 397.
45 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (2000).
46 See Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944
F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1991); GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 385-87.
47 See Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 1993); Pushman v. N.Y. Graphic Soc'y.,
39 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1942).
48 The Visual Artists and Galleries Association (VAGA) publishes a book entitled VAGA 2000,
containing an alphabetical listing of the artists represented in the United States by VAGA and the
Artists Rights Society. The book is available from VAGA at 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 6305, New York,
New York 10018.
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the usual trade-off between incentives and access. If one is skeptical that
reproduction rights have much impact on the incentives to create works of
art, then limiting the ability of educational institutions to make and distrib-
ute copies in digital format imposes access costs without offsetting bene-
fits.
A museum or educational institution also faces the problem of pro-
tecting the copies it lawfully makes. This is simply a variation of the ques-
tion posed in the Alfred Bell and Bridgeman cases: does the copy satisfy
the originality requirement? If creating copies in digital format is subject
to free riding by subsequent copiers, the incentive to make copies of origi-
nal works will be undermined in the absence of copyright protection. Even
so, administrative and licensing costs may make copyright protection inef-
ficient. If creating a digital image is like making a copy from a photocopy
machine, copying from a copy costs about the same as copying from the
original. Then, free riding is minimal and allowing unlimited copying will
save costs and not undermine the incentives to create copies in digital for-
mat.
4. Altering and Reselling a Copyrighted Work
In Lee v. A.R. T Co., the defendant A.R.T purchased note cards from
the plaintiff, affixed them to tiles, and resold them at retail. 49 Since copy-
ing was not involved, the plaintiff claimed that A.R.T. had infringed its
right to prepare a derivative work. The statute defines a derivative work
broadly to include "any other form in which a work may be recast, trans-
formed or adapted."5° These rights, however, are subject to another provi-
sion of the statute called the "first sale doctrine," which entitles the owner
of lawfully acquired copy to sell or otherwise dispose of the copy without
the copyright owner's consent.51 Frank Easterbrook held that A.R.T. had
not "transformed" the copy to bring it under the derivative work provision.
Rather, it had merely placed the equivalent of a mat or frame on a work it
purchased and then resold it.52 To be sure, arguments can be mustered on
both sides of the issue. But economics helps resolve this case consistent
with the social purpose of copyright law. Observe that the defendant's
activity benefited the plaintiff. The more tiled cards the defendant sold, the
more cards he will purchase from the plaintiff. Moreover, the plaintiffs
49 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997).
50 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (2000) (defining various terms, including "derivative work").
51 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)(l)(A) (2000). The first sale doctrine contains exceptions for renting
and leasing sound recordings (CDs, tapes) and computer programs without the copyright owner's
authorization. See id.
52 In an earlier case, Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.RT. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.
1988), the court found that the defendant's activity of cutting out reproductions from a book, fixing
them on tiles and then reselling them had infringed the copyright holder's derivative work right.
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position would transform copyright into a broad moral right under which
the author can block any minor alteration of which he disapproves. In the
end, this would harm creators because contracting costs would rise as gal-
leries, museums, and collectors would seek permission from the copyright
owner to mat and frame works of art to avoid copyright liability. Hence, a
finding that A.R.T. had not prepared a derivative work would reduce ac-
cess costs without harming, and possibly even enhancing, the incentives to
create the cards in the first place.
Before leaving this case there is a subtle and general point that should
be noted. Why would the plaintiff sue in circumstances where the defen-
dant's activity benefits him? One possibility is that the plaintiffs reputa-
tion will be harmed from the sale of a product that she believes damages
her reputation. But it seems implausible that mounting note cards on tiles
would tarnish or disparage the plaintiffs reputation. A more plausible ex-
planation is price discrimination. The plaintiff would like to charge higher
prices for note cards to parties who affix them to tiles and resell them than
to other purchasers. Arbitrage, however, makes price discrimination infea-
sible. But if the law enjoins the activity of affixing tiles to cards and sell-
ing them, the plaintiff will receive additional revenues either from granting
a license or from selling the tiled product itself. However, the incentive
argument is particularly weak. There is no indication that the plaintiff ever
contemplated producing tiled note cards or licensing others to do so. And
prospectively, a ruling favoring the plaintiff would make contracting over
appropriate frames and mats more costly in the art market.
B. Cases of Appropriation Art
Let me turn now to the cases involving appropriation art. There is a
widespread belief among members of the artistic community that copy-
right law poses a significant danger to appropriation art. Indeed, one
prominent member claimed that "[i]f these copyright laws had been ap-
plied from 1905 to 1975, we would not have modem art as we know it."53
These concerns are greatly exaggerated. The economic approach to copy-
right, which I have argued is the dominant approach to copyright, does not
inhibit appropriation art or other new and innovative approaches to the
visual arts. On the contrary, I will show below that the economic approach
allows unauthorized borrowing in numerous circumstances that in turn
promote artistic innovation.
53 See Geraldine Norman, The Power of Borrowed Images, ART & ANTIQUES, Mar. 1996, at 125
(quoting art dealer Jeffrey Deitch).
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1. Creating a Unique Work
Consider first the case of an artist who incorporates a copyrighted
photograph from, say, a popular magazine into a unique collage. The artist
removes the actual image from the magazine, affixes it to a board and adds
other objects, colors, and original images. No copy of the photograph is
made and the photograph itself may constitute only a small part of the
collage. This should be an easy case. Once the magazine has paid the
photographer for his work and charged consumers for copies of its maga-
zine, allowing appropriation would have no significant impact on the in-
centives to create new commercial photographs or publish magazines, but
it would enable potentially large savings in access and transaction costs.
Like the Lee case above,54 the socially efficient outcome would allow the
artist to use the image without the copyright holder's permission. To be
sure, a particular case might turn out the other way. Because a derivative
work includes "any other form in which a work may be recast, trans-
formed, or adapted,"55 a literal-minded court could find that a trivial or
minor alteration is an unauthorized derivative work not protected by the
first-sale doctrine. However, such a result would elevate literalism over
common sense and economics. It is worth recalling Learned Hand's often
repeated admonition that "it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and
developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary. 56
2. Creating Multiple Copies
One is more sympathetic to a copyright infringement claim against an
artist for incorporating a photograph into a series of prints. Unlike the pre-
vious case, unauthorized copies of the borrowed image are made. For ex-
ample, Henri Dauman, a French photographer, sued Andy Warhol's estate
over his "Jackie" series of silkscreen prints that incorporated a copyrighted
photograph of Jackie Kennedy that appeared in Life Magazine in 1963." 7
The photographer also sued the estate for reproducing the silkscreen im-
ages on calendars, posters, and other widely distributed merchandise.
It might seem unreasonable to draw a bright line between a one-time
use of an image lawfully acquired and reproducing that same image in
multiple copies. That distinction, however, goes to the heart of the eco-
nomic rationale for copyright. Commercial photographers are in the busi-
ness of licensing reproduction rights to their photographs for a variety of
unanticipated uses. Without copyright protection, the price of copies
54 125 F.3d 580.
55 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (2000).
56 Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945).
57 See Sarah King, Warhol Estate Sued over Jackie Photo, 85 ART 1N AM. 27 (Feb. 1997).
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would be driven down to the cost of copying, leaving nothing to cover the
cost of creating the work. Allowing an artist to make multiple copies with-
out authorization poses a more substantial threat to the incentives to create
new works than the unauthorized use of a lawfully acquired copy.
But that is not the end of the story. In the language of fair use, the
silk-screens created by Warhol are clearly a productive or transformative,
not a reproductive, use of Dauman's photograph. Warhol added substantial
original expression to the original image, and the silk-screens (one of
which sold in 1992 at Sotheby's for over $400,000) are not likely to cut
into the market for the photograph. The case was eventually settled so we
don't know how it would have come out. I suspect, however, that a court
would have rejected the fair use claim for two reasons. First, Warhol made
a large number of reproductions of the silk-screens on posters, calendars,
and other merchandise. Thus, Dauman's lost licensing revenues are likely
to be substantial, particularly if this signals to other manufacturers that
they need not pay to use photographic images that are incorporated in
works of art. Second, transaction costs were low enough to make a negoti-
ated license between Warhol and Dauman the likely outcome without al-
tering Warhol's incentives to use the original photograph.
Now imagine that Warhol had been less successful in commercializ-
ing his works and had stopped reproducing the photograph after complet-
ing a limited edition series of silkscreen prints. Then, the case for fair use
would be greatly strengthened. Permitting the limited use of copyrighted
images by Warhol and other artists would have a negligible effect on the
incomes, and hence, incentives of photographers to create new works. In
addition, fair use promotes greater access by eliminating licensing and
other transaction costs.
3. Appropriating from Multiple Sources
A variation of the Warhol case involved the Russian painter George
Pusenkoff, who used the outline of a nude from a Helmut Newton photo-
graph, a distinctive bright blue background from a Yves Klein's mono-
chromatic painting, and a small yellow square from the late Russian artist
Malevich.58 Neither Klein nor Malevich objected to Pusenkoff's borrow-
ing. Nor could they because the color blue and a yellow square are part of
the public domain. Newton, however, objected to the use of his photograph
and sought to have the painting destroyed. In Pusenkoff s defense, he cre-
ated a unique work not multiple copies, borrowed only the outline of a
photograph not the entire photograph, and transformed the photograph by
adding public domain material and altering the medium. On the other
58 See Geraldine Norman, The Power of Borrowed Images, ART & ANTIQUES, Mar. 1996, at
123.
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hand, he clearly copied Newton's well-known image without paying for it.
Indeed, his purpose was to copy recognizable elements from other artists.
His game "is to make canvases buzz with cultural associations by 'quot-
ing' from other artists-a perfectly respectable post-modernist approach to
picture-making."59
A German court held that Pusenkoff s painting was a free adaptation
rather than a reworking and, therefore, did not infringe Newton's copy-
right.6' From an economic standpoint, this is the right result. Pusenkoff s
"free adaption" was a productive or transformative use that does not sub-
stitute for the original photograph. To be sure, Newton might have given
up a small licensing fee, but that seems outweighed by the lower access
and licensing costs. Had Pusenkoff created posters and other merchandise
rather than a unique work, the outcome might well be different. Then, po-
tential lost licensing revenues become more significant. Moreover, there
would be no important difference between Pusenkoff s activity and that of
a commercial artist or business incorporating pre-existing copyrighted
images into a product for wide distribution. The intermediate position-a
limited edition series of prints-is the more difficult case to resolve. Like
the Warhol example above, fair use should turn on whether the savings in
access costs more than offset any small negative effects on the incentives
of commercial photographers and publishers.
The Pusenkoff example raises another issue. Transaction costs are
likely to be large if the law required the artist to obtain permission to ap-
propriate from multiple sources. Other things being the same, this implies
that the law should be more sympathetic to the artist whose work borrows
from multiple copyrighted sources.
4. Creating Sculptures from a Single Source
My next example is appropriation of mass media images by the artist
Jeff Koons who was the defendant in three similar copyright cases in the
Second Circuit.6 In the best-known case, Rogers v. Koons, the defendant
purchased a note card displaying a photograph of a group of puppies with
their owners, tore off the copyright notice from the card, and hired an Ital-
ian firm to make four large sculptures called "A String of Puppies" based
on the photograph. Koons' role was conceptual. He did not physically
make the sculptures, but he chose the subject matter, medium, size, mate-
59 See id.
60 See id. Newton was not happy with the German court's decision; he remarked: "Poor Fellow,
he hasn't got an idea of his own, so he has to use other people's." Id. at 125. Note, however, that copy-
right does not protect ideas.
61 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); Campbell v. Koons, No. 91CIV.6055,
1993 WL 97381, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993); United Feature Syndicate v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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rials, and colors. Koons communicated extensively with the studio and
provided them with detailed written instructions. He wrote that the sculp-
ture "must be just like photo-features of photo must be captured. 6 2 In-
deed, altering the image to avoid a copyright lawsuit would have defeated
his intended purpose of showing that meaning depends on context. Be-
cause Koons admitted copying the photograph, the only issue on appeal
was if his copying was protected as a fair use.
Counting against Koons' fair use argument, according to the court,
was the commercial nature of Koons' use; the fact that he earned a sub-
stantial sum from the sculptures (e.g., three of the four sculptures sold for
nearly $400,000); that Koons faithfully copied the original image; and that
the sculptures were likely to damage the market for the copyrighted photo-
graph. Although the products are in different markets and won't compete
against each other for sales, the court believed that Koons' use could po-
tentially eliminate an important source of licensing revenues for photogra-
phers and result in adverse incentive effects.
Koons' principle fair use argument was that his work should be
privileged as a satirical comment or parody. By placing this particular im-
age in a different context, Koons claimed he was commenting critically on
a political and economic system that places too much value on mass-
produced commodities and media images. Not surprisingly, the court re-
jected his defense. A privileged parody requires that it target the original
work. No privilege is given to a parody that uses the original work as a
"weapon" to comment on society at large. The economic rationale for this
distinction rests on the idea of high transaction costs preventing a value
maximizing exchange.63 When the parody targets the plaintiff's work, the
parties are unlikely to come to terms on a price that allows the defendant to
make fun, embarrass, or even humiliate the plaintiff's work. But such a use
may provide substantial benefits to third parties. On the other hand, if the
defendant uses the parodied work as a weapon to comment on society, he
should have little trouble licensing the work. Moreover, if the copyright
holder refuses, he can come to terms with another copyright holder of an
equally usable work.
Rogers v. Koons was not well received by the art community. Its
members feared that the decision would cripple appropriation art, under-
mine artistic freedom, and retard innovation. I believe this outcome is
highly improbable. The more likely outcome is that not much will change
other than appropriation artists paying small fees to license the images
they appropriate. This is just an application of the Coase theorem-in the
absence of transaction costs and wealth effects, the outcome will be inde-
pendent of the assignment of rights or liability rules.
62 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 305 (quoting Jeff Koons).
63 See Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, supra note 5.
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Licensing, however, is not free of difficulties. In some instances, an
artist will not able to license his first choice or he will wind up paying
more than he expected. Some copyright holders may grant licenses only if
they approve of the way their images are used. This, in turn, can under-
mine the critical message intended by the artist. Overall, these costs are
probably small. Licensing also entails transaction and contracting costs.
Finally, if the appropriation artist chooses not to pay, he faces risk-bearing
costs and potential litigation costs that could be significant, given that a
fair use defense will involve resolving the highly subjective "target versus
weapon" question. When these costs are weighed against the small benefi-
cial incentive effects to persons creating appropriated images, the most
efficient legal rule would allow appropriation provided the artist creates a
unique work or (as in the case of Jeff Koons) a limited number of copies.
On the other hand, if the appropriation artist creates multiple copies and,
particularly, if he reproduces his work on many ancillary products, there is
a strong economic case for finding a copyright violation.
5. Borrowing from One's Earlier Work
My final example is the case of an artist who appropriates images
from his earlier works. There is a long tradition of artists returning to basic
themes they had worked on earlier and even copying from their earlier
works. There are some extreme examples. Gilbert Stuart is reported to
have painted around seventy-five substantially similar portraits of George
Washington.64 Giorgio de Chirico made numerous copies during his life of
his best known early Surrealist works.6 5 The issue of unlawful appropria-
tion arises only if the artist no longer owns the copyright on the earlier
work. This helps explain a puzzling copyright doctrine in the case of a
unique work. Ownership of the copyright is separate from ownership of
the work itself.6 6 Thus, if A transfers a unique work to B, A retains the
copyright and B owns the work.67 Divided ownership, however, usually
raises transaction costs. For example, if C wants to reproduce A's work, he
must obtain access to the work from B and a license to copy from A. Typi-
cally, that will involve greater transaction costs than C dealing with B
alone, assuming B owns both the copyright and the work. But there are
added costs to such an arrangement. It will be more difficult for the artist
to return to earlier themes because he risks infringing the copyright on his
64 See WILLIAM D. GRAMPP, PRICING THE PRICELESS: ART, ARTISTS, AND ECONOMICS 6
(1989).
65 See KIM LEVIN, BEYOND MODERNISM: ESSAYS ON ART FROM THE '70S AND '80S 251-53
(1988).
66 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 202 (2000).
67 Of course, A may also transfer ownership of the copyright to B or anyone else, provided the
transfer is in writing. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 204(a) (2000).
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earlier work.68 Moreover, these problems will multiply if the artist borrows
images or elements from several of his earlier works in which he no longer
holds copyrights. Thus, the prospect that an artist will appropriate in the
future from earlier works may explain, in part, why divided ownership
reduces rather than increases transaction costs and, thereby, promotes effi-
ciency.
Appropriating from one's earlier work also brings out a difficult evi-
dentiary question. How would a trier of fact determine whether A has
copied from himself or independently created a work substantially similar
to his earlier work? Recall that section 102(b) of the Copyright Act makes
copying unlawful but not independent creation. Evidence on copying is
usually circumstantial and inferred from access and substantial similarity
between the two works. But access and substantial similarity won't do for
works created by the same party. Obviously, A had access to his earlier
work. And even if A created a new work without copying from his earlier
work, one would not be surprised if the two works looked substantially
similar. As Richard Posner, noted "[i]f Cezanne painted two pictures of
Mont St. Victoire, we should expect them to look more alike that if Ma-
tisse had painted the second, even if Cezanne painted the second painting
from life rather than from the first painting."69 Thus, the evidentiary value
of access and substantial similarity is attenuated when the same artist cre-
ated both works. This suggests that a much closer degree of similarity
would be required to infer copying when the same party created the two
works in question.7°
IV. CONCLUSION
Appropriation art poses no special problems for the application of
economic principles to copyright. Although there are no market impedi-
ments to licensing most copyrighted images used by appropriation artists,
fair use would lower transaction and access costs. These savings should
more than offset the reduced incentives to create new images in cases
where the appropriation artist has already paid for the image or is making
only a few copies. In contrast, when the appropriation artist makes many
copies, he should be treated no differently than a firm that incorporates
licensed images in products such as calendars, coffee mugs, and beach
towels. To sanction appropriation art in the latter case would weaken in-
centives to create new images, and add uncertainty to the already uncertain
68 In comments to me, Richard Posner noted that there are many examples in literature of
authors redoing their earlier work. Both Yeats and Auden, for example, revised their earlier poems
extensively, long after they were published. Had they assigned their copyrights to their publishers,
their revisions would have risked infringing copyrights owned by someone else.
69 Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1992).
70 See Franklin Mint, Corp. v. Nat'l Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978).
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question of whether or not something can be lawfully copied. Moreover, if
calling a work "art" shields it from copyright liability, we can be sure that
such claims would place more judges in the ill-suited position of having to
decide what is art. And as Justice Holmes warned in his much cited phrase:
"It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits."71
71 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
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